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Peru’s main fiscal instrument is the public sector budget, which is approved by Congress. The budget 
covers most central government operations, but not health and social security institutions, local 
governments or state-owned enterprises. It sets limits for non-financial expenditure and both domestic 
and foreign public debt service. It also includes detailed projections of tax and non-tax revenues and 
domestic and foreign debt disbursements. 
The fiscal year begins on 1 January. The budgetary process begins in May with the setting of the key 
macroeconomic assumptions for the following year: the real growth rate, inflation, the exchange rate 
and the level of exports and imports. The Ministry of Finance’s forecasts of aggregate revenue are 
then used in the expenditure estimates prepared by each government department. The budget 
proposal, which has to be consistent with the fiscal stance expressed in the multiannual 
macroeconomic framework,
2 is passed to Congress by 30 August in order to be approved as a budget 
law no later than 30 November. Otherwise the executive authority will enact it by decree. 
Congress cannot increase expenditure beyond the executive’s proposal. Moreover, any provision for 
tax exemption or benefit must be commented on by the Ministry of Finance. Supplementary budgets 
follow the same procedures as the budget itself; any increase in spending or transfer of funds requires 
congressional approval. 
A set of laws enacted by the Congress complement budgetary practices: 
•   the Law of Financial Equilibrium specifies the amount of the deficit to be financed within the 
year according to the maximum level of spending and estimated revenues; 
•   the Law of Borrowing fixes the maximum amount of borrowing from abroad and domestic 
sources; 
•   the Law of Budget Management sets the fundamental budgetary procedures to be followed 
by public sector entities. 
Coverage of public sector statistics 
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (CRBP) compiles government financial statistics in accordance 
with the IMF’s Manual for Government Financial Statistics published in 1986. It does so not merely to 
satisfy its legal duty of informing the public about the nation’s finances, but because of the implications 
of public finances for the current and future state of the economy and inflation. 
Graph 1 shows the structure of the Peruvian public sector employed in the CRBP’s fiscal statistics. 
This institutional coverage includes both on-budget and off-budget operations of the central 
government, social security system, regional and local governments, state-owned enterprises; other 
                                                       
1  Vice Minister of Finance and member of the Board of Directors of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
2  The Law of Prudence and Fiscal Transparency requires that a multiannual macroeconomic framework containing fiscal and 
macro projections for the next three years be prepared by 30 April and presented to Congress by 30 August with the budget 
proposal. 
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 public entities (eg universities, regulatory agencies and decentralised agencies), and public funds 
such as the Consolidated Pension Fund and National Savings Fund. 
Graph 1 




National Pension Savings Fund
























In recent years a significant effort has been made to improve the government’s financial management 
system. The “Integrated System of Financial Management”, launched in 1999, centralised the 
budgetary and treasury operations of all spending units. As it covers all operations, it provides the 
Treasury with a continuously updated flow of information regarding the budgetary acquisitions, 
payments and balances of all units in the public sector, which facilitates the compilation, monitoring 
and analysis of public sector financial statistics. 
Monetary policy framework 
The Peruvian constitution, enacted in 1983, establishes two fundamental aspects of monetary policy: 
•   The CRBP’s objective is to preserve monetary stability: to contribute to economic welfare 
through the elimination of inflation. International experience shows the impossibility of 
economic development in an inflationary environment. A general increase in the price level 
adversely affects productivity and imposes a burden on the poor through the inflation tax. 
•   The CRBP relies on the autonomy established in its charter. This autonomy is necessary to 
insulate monetary policy from political pressure to fund public expenditure or overheat the 
economy. International experience shows that countries with autonomous central banks 
have the lowest and most stable inflation rates. 
In order to ensure its independence, the CRBP is legally prohibited from undertaking the following 
operations: 
•   Financing the public sector. The CRBP can only buy government securities in the secondary 
market up to 5% of the base money stock as at the end of the previous year. 
•   Providing guarantees to public or private financing operations. 
•   Granting selective credit. There is no development banking system in Peru. It was 
deactivated in the early 1990s following poor performance in the 1980s. During that time 
central bank credit to development banks was a major source of base money creation and 
contributed to higher inflation. However, in 2002 an agrarian bank was established with a 
small capital base. 
•   Operating a multiple exchange rate regime. Such a regime existed in Peru during the second 
half of the 1980s and was also a source of inflationary pressures. 
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 This strong legal framework guarantees the CRBP’s balance sheet independence. Therefore it is not 
engaged in any quasi-fiscal operations. When fiscal support was given to domestic commercial banks, 
only government funds were used. 
During recent years, monetary policy was conducted by approving an operating target for the 
disposable volume of banks’ liquidity, aimed at a predetermined base money growth. This growth was 
consistent with the inflation target established in the annual monetary programme, after considering 
the determinants of the demand for money. The base money growth rate was therefore considered an 
intermediate target between the operating target of banks’ liquidity and the target inflation rate 
considered relevant to anchoring the inflation expectations of economic agents. 
Since the early 1990s some central banks have adopted explicit inflation targeting, aimed at directly 
relating monetary policy decisions, based on an operating target, to the inflation outcome. To anchor 
inflationary expectations, these central banks announce an inflation target and employ an information 
strategy to communicate the policy actions to be adopted to achieve the target. 
In January 2002, the CRBP’s directors announced that monetary policy would be based on explicit 
inflation targeting (Box 1). Decisions on the monetary policy operating target are based on 
assessments of inflation determinants such as surveys of inflationary expectations, the growth rate of 
monetary aggregates, real GDP growth and fluctuations in the exchange rate. For example, if weak 
domestic demand pushes inflation below target, monetary policy will be expansionary, but if excessive 
aggregate expenditure growth compromises the inflation target, then monetary policy will be tightened. 
The target for annual inflation is 2.5% with a margin of ± 1 percentage point. This range is the target 
for 2003 and beyond, so it is also the medium-term goal of monetary policy in Peru. 
Box 1 
Main features of the new inflation targeting regime 
•   Announcement of an inflation target. 
•   Autonomy to implement an operating target, which is discretionally modified by the CRBP according to 
an integral analysis of the factors affecting the price level. 
•   Management of an operating target, according to the achievement of the inflation target and not of any 
other nominal variable, such as a monetary aggregate or the exchange rate. Hence this scheme is 
consistent with a floating exchange rate regime. 
•   Transparency on the objectives and monetary decisions of the central bank. 
Since January 2003, the CRBP has been taking and releasing monthly its monetary policy decisions in 
terms of its interest rates for lending and borrowing with banks. These rates establish a reference 
corridor for interest rates in the interbank market.
3 They are still related to the operating target (the 
average monthly balance of the accounts banks hold at the CRBP). In addition, the CRBP continues 
to release each month estimates of the banks’ average daily disposable liquidity. 
In order to achieve the banks’ monthly ranges of liquidity, the CRBP relies on tools to inject or 
withdraw liquidity from the market. To inject liquidity, the CRBP temporarily repurchases its own 
certificates of deposit. It also grants monetary regulation credit and purchases foreign currency in the 
spot market. Conversely, the CRBP withdraws liquidity by auctioning certificates of deposit, taking 
overnight deposits and selling foreign currency in the spot market. 
                                                       
3  If the interbank rate is higher than the rate used for liquidity lending by the CRBP, then the higher one will continue to be 
applied. Thus, the provision of liquidity by the CRBP will not validate abrupt changes in short-term expectations. 
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 2.  Fiscal positions in emerging economies in the medium term 
Measuring fiscal positions 
The main fiscal indicator used by the CRBP is the overall balance of the non-financial public sector.
4 
For the economic programme and the targets published in the multiannual macroeconomic framework, 
the performance criteria are expressed in terms of this measure of the fiscal position. 
The advantage of setting fiscal targets using this measure is its wide coverage, which eliminates the 
incentive to move expenditure among government units that is present when targets are set using a 
measure with narrow institutional coverage, such as central government. The main drawback is data 
availability. As statistics on the non-financial public sector are only available quarterly, the CRBP also 
looks at the monthly central government accounts. The CRBP also monitors fiscal actions on a daily 
basis through the Public Treasury Cash Flow. This statement comprise inflows and outflows of cash in 
the main accounts of the Treasury at its financial agent, Banco de la Nación. These accounts are 
important not only because a large proportion of fiscal operations are recorded in them, but because 
movements in these balances affect the level of deposits held by Banco de la Nación at the CRBP, 
thus directly affecting the creation of base money. 
Assessing fiscal policy sustainability 
The CRBP’s assessment of fiscal policy sustainability focuses on the public debt/GDP ratio. The main 
difference between the CRBP’s practice and standard assessments is the stress on the process of 
issuing new (marketable) public debt. As at end-2002 a significant share of the outstanding public debt 
was issued at very low (concessional) interest rates. Since the government will rely in the coming 
years on capital markets to finance deficits and amortise the current public debt, it will face a higher 
interest rate. The main implication is that in order to reduce the burden of interest payments and 
control pressure on the fiscal balance, a sustainable fiscal policy will have to reduce the debt/GDP 
ratio. Just keeping the ratio constant would require continuous adjustments in the primary balance, 
which is in itself inconsistent with the definition of a sustainable fiscal policy. 
Constraints on provincial and local fiscal positions 
Currently there are no hard fiscal rules on sub-national (local) governments. However, as part of the 
ongoing decentralisation process, provisions are being taken to avoid their excessive indebtedness. 
Newly elected regional governments took office in 2003, resulting in three tiers of government: 
national, regional and local. These new regional authorities will receive resources and perform duties 
previously assigned to central government units. According to the Decentralisation Law of July 2002, 
this transfer will be based on five principles: 
i.  Clearly defined responsibilities for the national, regional and local levels of government to 
enhance accountability. 
ii.  Transparency and predictability. 
iii.  Neutrality, which means that no resources will be transferred to the regional government 
without the corresponding functional responsibility. This will reduce the scope for 
discretionary use of fiscal resources at the regional level. 
iv.  The final decision on fiscal indebtedness is reserved for the national government. That 
means that regional and local governments can issue debt only with the guarantee of the 
central government. 
v. Fiscal  responsibility:  fiscal  rules that limit the growth rate of regional and local government 
expenditure and debt will be drawn up and enacted. These rules should be consistent with 
                                                       
4  As defined in the IMF’s Manual for government financial statistics. 
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 the limits approved in the Fiscal Law. Moreover, the central government will be prohibited 
from assuming debts issued by regional and local governments. 
These principles should help avoid pressures on the fiscal deficit arising from these new governmental 
entities. 
As at end-2002, local governments were able to issue debt backed by their own resources without 
central government authorisation. Local government debt is currently insignificant (USD 40 million in 
December 2001) and has only involved credit from banks, principally the state-owned Banco de la 
Nación. 
Enhanced market determination of interest rates and fiscal discipline 
During 1975-90 Peru had increasing inflation. This unstable environment reduced the ability of the 
government to issue securities in financial markets. The main source of government financing was 
central bank credit and external debt, with further arrears on public external debt. During the 1990s 
fiscal operations were mainly financed from proceeds of privatisation and borrowing from multilateral 
agencies. There is therefore no developed market for government bonds. Recent issuance of 
domestic public debt started in 2001. The main objectives of public debt management strategy are to: 
•   Develop domestic capital markets. Government bond issues generate a yield curve that 
serves as a benchmark for other domestic bonds. 
•   Create an institutional framework. This is essential since the Treasury has no reputation as a 
bond issuer. 
•   Generate resources to service external debt. Although fiscal adjustment and privatisation 
constitute important mechanisms for meeting external debt repayments, in the medium term 
additional resources will be needed. Domestic financing also reduces the exchange rate risk. 
•   Manage short-term debt. The introduction of short-term liabilities (treasury bills) improve 
management of seasonal and other short-term fluctuations in the public finances. 
It is very important to guarantee the domestic financing framework as an additional source of funds to 
avoid adverse effects from external shocks, as happened in the past. It is highly recommended to 
keep this domestic framework transparent and reliable. Prudent treasury management will contribute 
necessary financial support to fiscal policy in the long term. 
As argued above, as the government will face market interest rates higher than those currently 
applicable to the public debt, there needs to be a gradual adjustment to the fiscal balance. The most 
recent revision of the multiannual macroeconomic framework proposes a decreasing path for the 
deficit from 2.3% of GDP in 2002 to 0.8% by 2005. 
Effectiveness of fiscal rules 
The Fiscal Law of December 1999 aimed at contributing to economic stability and growth by creating a 
sound fiscal framework for the medium-term. It restricts the fiscal deficit, limits the growth of 
non-financial expenditures of the general government and establishes a stabilisation fund intended to 
smooth income fluctuations associated with the business cycle. In election years, the Law imposes 
additional restrictions on both the public sector balance and general government non-financial 
expenditures. 
In order to render fiscal management both transparent and reliable, the Law requires the publication of 
a three-year macroeconomic framework containing the fundamental principles of fiscal policy, as well 
as macroeconomic forecasts for variables such as income and fiscal expenditures, investment and 
public indebtedness. It also describes how the macroeconomic framework is to be approved and 
published so that the government’s fiscal policy intentions will be clearly understood by economic 
agents. 
Rules and exceptions 
The quantitative rules are set out in Table 1. However, in cases of national emergency or international 
crises, the executive authority can request Congress to suspend any of them for one year. If there is 
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 evidence of a decrease in output or the significant likelihood it may decrease in real terms in the 
following period, the fiscal deficit could be allowed to exceed 1% of GDP, but not more than 2%. 
 
Table 1 




Rule Actual Rule Actual 
Overall balance (as % of GDP)  2.0  3.2    1.5
2 2.5 
Real non-financial expenditure (maximum % change)  2.0 0.6 2.0  –5.0 
For election years (Jan-Jul as % of annual total)         
 Non-financial  expenditures    60  58  60  56 
 Budget  deficit  50  39  50  20 
1  In 2001 Congress enacted a law declaring that the quantitative limits of the Fiscal Law for 2001 and 2002 were not 
binding.   
2  1% in following years. 
 
Fiscal stabilisation fund 
The fiscal stabilisation fund is constituted by the following resources: 
•   current revenues from ordinary sources exceeding the average of the last three years by 
0.3% of GDP; 
•   75% of privatisation revenues; 
•   50% of net revenue from concessions. 
However, accumulated savings must not exceed 3% of GDP and the excess will be applied to the 
Consolidated Provision Reserve Fund or a reduction of public debt. 
The use of the resources of the fund is contingent on an expected decrease in ordinary revenues of 
more than 0.3% of GDP relative to the average of the last three years, adjusted by significant changes 
in tax policy. 
However, the Annual Budget Law for 2002 reduced the amount of privatisation revenue directed to the 
fund to 10% and the Decentralisation Law made it permanent. 
Transparency procedures 
The multiannual macroeconomic framework includes a statement of fiscal policy principles, which 
contains the economic policy guidelines and long-run fiscal objectives. In addition, the framework 
presents the three-year targets for the fiscal deficit, as well as macroeconomic forecasts, fiscal 
revenues and expenditures, investment and public indebtedness. The CRBP issues a technical report, 
which includes an analysis of the consistency of the framework with the forecasts for the balance of 
payments and international reserves, and with monetary policy. 
The Law establishes how the framework will be approved and published, as well as the performance 
reports, the responsibility fulfilment statement and the interpretation and prohibition procedures, 
designed to convey to the public the intentions of the government concerning fiscal matters. 
Despite the deficit ceilings not being achieved in 2001-02, due to the adverse international shocks that 
affected the Peruvian economy, the limits on non-financial government expenditure growth were 
respected (Table 1). The Fiscal Law also succeeded in imposing a higher level of transparency on 
fiscal policymaking due to the periodic publication of the Multiannual Macroeconomic Framework, 
which enhanced communication between the public and the fiscal authorities. 
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 3.  Countercyclical policy: monetary policy, fiscal policy or both? 
Risks in departing from the medium-term orientation of monetary and fiscal policies 
The main role of the CRBP is to promote price stability. That goal is understood as avoiding both 
inflationary and deflationary pressures. For example, in 2001 inflation was –0.1%, indicating weak 
domestic demand. This was well below the 2.5 ± 1% target for 2002 and beyond. Accordingly, a more 
expansionary monetary policy was adopted in August 2001. 
With respect to fiscal policy, the medium-term orientation was set in the multiannual macroeconomic 
framework published by the Ministry of Finance. That document suggests a decreasing path for the 
fiscal deficits which is consistent with the inflation target set by the CRBP and with a sustainable path 
for public debt. 
Cyclically adjusted budget position 
A simple measure of structural balance is used to assess discretionary changes in fiscal policies. The 
structural deficit is defined as the level of deficit that would prevail if the economy were on its long term 
growth trend. Changes in the structural balance are therefore a measure of discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy. 
Estimating this measure requires calculation of the GDP trend and the responsiveness of each 
component of fiscal revenue and expenditure to changes in economic activity: 
•   Trend GDP is estimated using a production function approach. A Cobb-Douglas aggregate 
production function is estimated using long-term data on output, capital and labour inputs. 
Thus, a measure of total factor productivity is derived. Trend output is defined as the level of 
output consistent with the trend total factor productivity (estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter) given actual levels of capital stock and labour input. 
•   Revenue responsiveness to GDP is calculated as a weighted average of elasticities of tax 
and non-tax items with respect to GDP. The weights are the proportion of each item in 
general government revenues in 2000. 
•   Expenditure responsiveness to GDP was assumed to be zero as Peru has neither 
unemployment benefits nor other kinds of fiscal expenditure stabilisers such as agricultural 
or mining price stabilisation funds. 











sb = structural balance as a percentage of actual GDP 
t = fiscal revenues as a percentage of actual GDP 
g = fiscal expenditure as a percentage of actual GDP 
β = tax elasticity with respect to GDP 
gap = GDP gap as a percentage of trend GDP. 
Clearly, when the GDP gap is zero the actual and structural balances are equal. A positive GDP gap 
corresponds to a structural balance lower than the actual fiscal balance, reflecting the positive impact 
on fiscal revenue of a high level of economic activity. 
Using these assumptions, Table 2 shows the evolution of the estimated structural fiscal balance. 
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 Table 2 
Peru’s structural budget balance
1 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
I. Primary  balance  2.2 1.3  –0.8  –0.9  –0.1 
II. Interest  payments  –1.9 –2.0 –2.2 –2.3 –2.2 
III.  Overall balance (I + II)  0.3 –0.7 –3.0 –3.2 –2.3 
IV. GDP  gap  4.1  0.2 –1.7 –0.8 –2.9 
V.  Cyclical component of the deficit  0.8  0.0 –0.3 –0.1 –0.5 
VI.  Structural balance (III -  V)  –0.5 –0.7 –2.7 –3.1 –1.8 
VII. Fiscal  impulse
2  –0.7 0.2 1.9 0.4  –1.3 
1  Consolidated public sector as a percentage of GDP.   
2  Measure of change in fiscal stance corresponding to change in 
structural balance. 
 
Table 2 shows the importance of fiscal stabilisers. During 1991-2001 the absolute value of the cyclical 
component of the deficit averaged 0.5% of GDP, while the average fiscal balance was a deficit of 2.4% 
of GDP. 
The last episode of significant fiscal expansion occurred in 1999, when the government reacted to the 
drop in domestic demand caused by external shocks (Russian and Brazilian crises) by expanding the 
coverage of tax exemptions and increasing non-financial expenditures. The fiscal expansion was 
financed using public sector deposits generated by previous privatisations. Thus, it was not necessary 
to issue new debt. This point is relevant as those deposits are no longer available, and given the 
previous discussion on debt dynamics the scope for an expansionary countercyclical fiscal policy is 
now reduced. 
Relative weights given to monetary and fiscal countercyclical policies 
The combination of flexible exchange rates and the liberalisation of the capital account usually 
reduces the power of fiscal policy. In addition, Peru’s relatively high public debt limits the scope for a 
proactive countercyclical fiscal policy. A certain amount of macroeconomic stabilisation is possible by 
changing the composition of government expenditure. For example, a shift from imported military 
goods to domestically produced goods and services could raise effective demand. However, under 
current budgetary procedures the time needed for such shifts could be so long that they would not 
respond in time to disturbances affecting the economy. Therefore, most of the stabilising effects of 
fiscal policy should occur through the operation of built-in stabilisers (basically in the revenue side of 
the budget). 
Accordingly, the responsibility of macroeconomic stabilisation will be mainly assumed by monetary 
policy. The new inflation targeting regime implies that the stance of monetary policy will be adjusted in 
response to shocks that may drive actual inflation above or below its target level. Typical demand 
shocks, associated with unexpected changes in private consumption or investment, would generate 
monetary responses aimed at reducing their likely impact on inflation. Thus, monetary policy would 
perform an important stabilising role. 
Long-term interest rates 
Long-term government bond yields are currently used as a benchmark. The government has been 
issuing bonds in the domestic market since 2001, as a way of developing the domestic capital market. 
However, this is a fledgling market given the short history of public domestic bonds. 
As Peru is a small open economy, foreign currency interest rates are mainly determined by 
international rates plus a spread reflecting sovereign risk. Domestic currency interest rates are also 
affected by depreciation expectations. Thus, a sustainable fiscal policy would end up endogenously 
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 with a lower interest rate rather than an unsustainable one. Interest rates have been market-
determined since 1990. 
Monetary and fiscal coordination 
Monetary policy decisions are taken by the CRBP board in an autonomous way. However, since fiscal 
actions affect the current state of the economy and its likely evolution, forecasting inflation requires 
close coordination with the fiscal authorities. This is carried out at different levels: 
•   Treasury cash flow management. The CRBP’s General Manager is a member of the 
Treasury Cash Flow Committee, which is responsible for setting the level of government 
expenditure according to the revenue projections each month. Daily information on treasury 
operations is very important for programming monetary operations at the central bank as it 
can affect the money market. 
•   Financial programming. Fiscal accounts are an important component of financial 
programming exercises at the CRBP. The projection of fiscal variables is made in close 
coordination with the Ministry of Finance. This allows the CRBP to incorporate them into its 
monetary programme, taking into account its effect on total currency and credit availability to 
the private sector, and the projections of the balance of payments and the accumulation of 
international reserves. 
Table 3 shows the evolution of inflation, the ranges announced by the CRBP and a measure of the 
change in the fiscal policy stance since 1994. Both fiscal and monetary policy were consistent with the 
main goal of bringing inflation down to international levels. Moreover, when actual inflation showed a 
rising trend (for instance in 1996) the stance of fiscal policy was adjusted to dampen aggregate 
demand and help reduce inflationary pressures and current account deficits. When weak domestic 
demand drove inflation below the range, fiscal policy was relaxed to avoid deflation. 
 
Table 3 
Inflation and fiscal impulses  
  Target range  Actual inflation  Fiscal impulse 
1994 15.0-20.0  15.4  0.8 
1995 9.0-11.0  10.2  0.8 
1996 9.5-11.5  11.8  –2.8 
1997 8.0-10.0  6.5  –0.7 
1998 7.5-9.0  6.0  0.2 
1999 5.0-6.0  3.7  1.9 
2000 3.5-4.0  3.7  0.4 
2001 2.5-3.5  –0.1  –1.3 
2002 1.5-3.5 1.5   
2003 1.5-3.5     
 
4.  Central bank balance sheets and fiscal policy-type operations 
The importance of seigniorage 
Table 4 shows the evolution of seigniorage, measured as the flow of base money expressed as a 
percentage of nominal GDP. The narrow definition of money was used to approximate the real 
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resources the public sector obtains from issuing money. Table 4 shows that this variable is small and 
is basically explained by the CRBP’s foreign exchange market operations. Public sector operations are 
essentially movements in Treasury accounts with the CRBP. Its sign is usually negative, which means 
that fiscal operations have been financed mainly by non-inflationary issuance of (both internal and 





  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Seigniorage 0.8  0.2  0.5 0.2 0.5  –0.2 0.2 
Public sector operations  0.0 –0.3 –0.1 –0.3 –0.1  0.0  0.1 
Foreign exchange operations  0.6 0.1 0.9  –0.6 0.5 0.1 0.2 
Other 0.2  0.4  –0.3  1.1 0.1  –0.3  –0.1 
1  As a percentage of GDP. 
 
Quasi-fiscal operations of the central bank 
As mentioned in Section 1, the CRBP’s operating framework guarantees balance sheet 
independence, which means that the central bank’s resources are not employed in quasi-fiscal 
operations. This independence is necessary to allow the CRBP to accomplish its main goal of price 
stability. 
Bank balance sheets and central bank resources 
From the point of view of the CRBP, the decision to rescue a troubled financial institutions is a matter 
of fiscal policy design. Correspondingly, neither central bank resources nor guarantees have been 
devoted to this kind of programme. However, since 1998 the government has decided to help stressed 
financial institutions by buying part of their poorly performing assets. This operation has been financed 
through the issuance of Treasury bonds that are mainly held by the banking system. As at end-June 
2002, the stock of such bonds was equivalent to USD 770 million, or 1.4% of GDP. 